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I. Introduction
In recent years a growing number of papers have looked at various aspects of globalization and
its implications for competition and trade policy. While both trade liberalization and competition
policy are aimed at promoting product market competition they operate via different channels.
Trade policy, which is the responsibility of supra-national bodies like the WTO, aims to
safeguard the free flow of goods and services. Competition policy, which is the responsibility of
national authorities, tries to guarantee market access and contestability. When dealing with issues
of ‘Trade And Competition’ attention should not be limited to issues relating to the product
market but one should also look at implications for imperfect labour markets.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of a reduction in product market
monopoly power on the domestic sectoral labour market when there is a labour union bargaining
with the domestic firm(s) over wage levels. A different but equally interesting question which
will not be explicitly dealt with here, is the way in which labour market imperfections may affect
the contestability of markets as shown for example by Dewatripont (1988).
Globalization has been blamed for the increasing unemployment in Europe and the
widening of wage differentials in the US (Wood 1994). In general there is no clear consensus as
to how much trade has mattered (Faini et al. 1998). Trade economists have looked for inward
shifts of labour demand caused by increased trade with low wage countries which could explain
in a Stolper-Samuelson framework the reduced demand for less skilled workers. (Leamer 1994,
Wood 1995, Borjas & Ramey, 1992) but with mixed success. This could be due to a number of
reasons. Most of the empirical work testing for the effects of increased international competition
on the demand for labour or wage differentials has used data at the sectoral level thereby missing
a lot of the within sector reallocation and heterogeneity of firms (Revenga, 1992; Slaughter,
1996). This could also be due to ill-defined measures of international competition.
A final reason why the evidence is poor could also be related to the fact that most papers miss
out on important institutional characteristics of the labour market or simply that trade does not
have much effect.
This paper makes a threefold contribution to this literature. First, we  provide a simple
theoretical framework that exposes a mechanism through which increased competition affects
domestic jobs and wages. An important element in this is the role trade unions play as suggested
empirically by Gaston and Trefler (1995) and Konings and Vandenbussche (1995). We define
international competition as an increase in the number of firms that become active in the relevant
product market of Belgian firms but which are located outside Belgium. National competition is
defined as an increase in the number of firms active in the relevant product market located in
Belgium. The results indicate that an increase in national competition (FDI or domestic entry),
puts domestic workers in a stronger position. The probability of finding a job for workers in the
imperfectly competitive sector goes up which can increase domestic wage levels above the
autarky level and reduce employment below the autarky level. Moreover, prices could go up
despite entry. International import competition however, has very different effects since wage
levels abroad are out of reach of the domestic union (and assumed to be exogenous here).
International competition will always lower domestic wages which could even increase
employment despite the foreign imports. This seems to suggest that competition policy and trade
policy are complements in order to reduce labour market imperfections and to go towards more
competitive markets. As will be shown below, market accessibility is not sufficient to guarantee
lower price levels in the product market.
A second contribution is that in our empirical analysis we will use data at the firm level
which is more disaggregated than the studies using sectoral data. We turn to company accounts
supplemented with a postal survey carried out in 2041 Belgian firms with a response rate of 12%
in 1997. For the period ‘94-97 international competition was felt most strongly from Central3
Europe and the Far East. In 58% of the firms in the survey bargaining occurs at the firm level. In
those firms where unions matter, in 69% of the firms bargaining is on wages. An index of job
reallocation (Konings 1995) will be used to measure the degree of inter-firm mobility of labour
in a sector. For those firms that experienced an increase in national competition, domestic wages
turn out to be significantly higher when the inter-firm mobility of labour in the sector is high as
predicted by the theory.
Third, most of the empirical papers so far have focused on the effects on US labour
markets, the US being a large economy with a large domestic market. Little is known about the
effects on European labour markets consisting of a large number of small open economies that
are probably more exposed to international shocks. This is particularly relevant as with the
opening of Central and Eastern Europe and with the increased economic integration of the
European Union, competitive pressures will likely filter through in the European labour markets
characterized by high unemployment and high and rigid labour costs. Belgium is a small open
economy, characterized by high unemployment and strong labour unions, so it provides a good
illustration.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we provide a theoretical framework
which captures the interaction between increased competition in the product market and
imperfect labour markets. An effort is made to avoid mathematical notation in the text. The
functional forms used and the derivation of the results can be found in the appendix
1. Section III
discusses the data set, the econometric tests and the results. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Theoretical Framework
In this section we show how in the presence of trade unions and endogenous wage determination
the effects of national and international competition on the domestic labour market differ. To this
end we use simple theoretical tools in which we reduce the monopoly power of a domestic
incumbent firm by allowing entry which leads to certain employment and wage effects. Our
findings suggest different results depending on the nature of competition - national or
international - and on the level at which domestic trade unions bargain over domestic wages - at
the firm or sector level. For a number of European countries, such as Belgium, wages are
negotiated at both levels.
On the empirical side, recent findings suggest that labour market imperfections and the
degree of competition, measured by the number of rivals in the industry are important factors
which interact with increased domestic and foreign competition to explain the effects on
domestic employment and wage levels (Brander and Spencer, 1988; Mezzetti and Dinopoulos,
1991; Motta 1992; Konings and Vandenbussche, 1995; Wes, 1995).
In order to study the effects of increased competition in the presence of product and
labour market imperfections, we start off by considering an incumbent firm enjoying a high
degree of monopoly power. Then we proceed by allowing an entrant into the domestic market
which can be either national or international. By a national entrant we mean a firm with
production facilities within the incumbent’s country borders
2. While a international competitor
exports to the incumbent’s relevant product market. In the national and international duopoly
case we assume Cournot competition in the product market.
                                                          
1 A more detailed explanation of the model can be found in the working paper version Vandenbussche and
Konings (1998)
2 We assume national entry to be costless. Smith (1987) shows how fixed costs affect the decision of a
multinational firm to either export or invest abroad.4
The Model
The simple theoretical framework which we present in this section does not pretend to be
an exhaustive alternative to the other more traditional theories trying to capture the effects of
globalization. In contrast, our aim is to point out that geographical location matters when
institutional settings like trade unions are country specific
3. While different employment effects
of national versus international competition with exogenous wages in the domestic market seem
obvious, we will show that this is no longer the case with endogenous wage determination.
Similar to Mezetti and Dinopoulos (1991) and Bughin and Vannini (1995) we construct a
simple partial equilibrium model
4 whereby in autarky a homogenous good is produced by a
monopolist. Demand for the good in the relevant product market (could be situated outside the
domestic country) is assumed to be linear (expression A.1 in the appendix.) A reduction in
monopoly power in this sector either occurs through entry of a domestically based competitor or
through imports. We move from a domestic monopoly to a Cournot duopoly in both cases. As
explained earlier the distinction between national and international competition depends on
location not on ownership. National entry could be the result of competition policy aimed to
improve market access while international competition could be the result of trade liberalization
5.
Wages in the imperfectly competitive national sector (W) are determined through a Nash
bargaining process between the union and the national firm(s) After the wage has been set,
employment is decided by the firm(s) as a function of the domestic and foreign wage and the
product market competition. The wage level abroad is assumed to be exogenous.
The assumption about the production function we make is arguably the most
controversial one but simplifies our analysis greatly. We simply assume that one unit of labour
(L) is needed to produce one unit of output (X) thereby not allowing for capital/labour
substitution (similar to Brander and Spencer 1988, Mezetti & Dinopoulos 1991, Bughin and
Vannini 1995). This of course poses serious limitations on our analysis. Nevertheless we believe
that a function of the form X=L, which provides an easy relationship between production and
employment, will allow us to indicate how a reduction in monopoly power in the product market
is likely to affect the labour market. What has to be kept in mind is that the results we obtain are
likely to be underestimates. When labour becomes more expensive, allowing for capital/labour
substitution will bring about a further reduction in employment because expensive labour will be
replaced by relatively cheaper capital; which is not captured by our simple production function.
In the opposite case when labour becomes cheaper, allowing for capital/labour substitution will
work in the other direction rendering our estimate of employment creation again an
                                                          
3 Our aim is not to study the decision exports versus FDI by a foreign multinational (see Motta 1992, Smith
1987, Zhao 1998). Neither do we look at equilibrium market structures (see Horstmann and Markusen
1992) or trade policy in the presence of unions (see Brander and Spencer 1988). For a discussion of welfare
effects of exports versus FDI see Bughin and Vannini (1995). Instead we focus on the distinction between
national and international competition (which entails more than FDI/exports) and the effects on domestic
wages and employment which is relevant for governments when evaluating the effects of competition versus
trade policy on labour markets.
4 For the case of international competition the analysis could easily be extended to a more general
equilibrium setup. In addition to an imperfectly competitive sector one could assume a perfectly competitive
numeraire sector where prices and wages equal unity. The numeraire sector would ensure that trade is
balanced and that employment which is freed up from the Cournot sector is absorbed at the unity wage. The
fall back income of workers would then equal the wage of the numeraire sector.
5 International competition usually also refers to a rise in the mobility of capital across borders. However,
FDI here is classified as an increase in national competition. Crucial in our definitions is whether the
competitor is located within the borders of the country where labour unions are active.5
underestimate of what is likely to be the true employment creation. Given that we know how
capital/labour substitution is likely to affect the results we feel we can go ahead using our simple
production function.
There is a lot of controversy as to what is the best way to model a union. Following
Brander and Spencer (1988) and Mezetti and Dinopoulos (1991) we use a Stone-Geary utility
function (A.2 in the appendix). The union’s utility depends on both wages (W) and employment
(L). Although the functional form chosen here is not the only alternative available, it has the
advantage of being tractable and well behaved. Our results however do not depend on this
specification for union utility. Common to most utility functions is that positive utility is derived
from home wages (W) that lie above the fall back income (Wa) and employment at that wage
level. An increase in the fall back income (Wa) will always lower union utility but will always
increase the wage secured in the bargaining process between union and firm.
The fall back income of a worker (Wa) is considered to be a function of the wage paid by other
firms in the sector, the degree of mobility of workers between firms in the sector (a) and the
income in case of unemployment (non-labour income) represented by B which for simplicity is
set equal to zero (A.3 in the appendix)
6. Another way of interpreting a is the amount of friction
in the labour market. A value of a=1 means the domestic labour market is frictionless and there
is perfect mobility of labour between firms. While for a=0, labour market rigidities are so high
that  despite the presence of other firms in the market, labour is immobile between firms
7. Due to
the partial equilibrium nature of the model the only type of labour reallocation we allow for is
intra-sector reallocation. This is in line with recent empirical evidence which has revealed that
despite the prominent role of inter-sector labour reallocation in the more traditional Hecksher-
Ohlin type of trade models, most of the job reallocation is occurring between plants and within
sectors (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, Levinsohn, 1996). In the empirical analysis in section III,
the parameter a will be proxied by an index which measures the extent of inter-versus intra-
sector reallocation of labour.
In the first stage of this model wage negotiations take place along a non-cooperative Nash
bargaining process (equation (A.4) in appendix). Those not familiar with this concept can think
of a pie that needs to be divided between workers (in terms of the wages they get) and owners of
the firm (in terms of the profits they get). How this pie will be divided depends on the bargaining
strength of the two parties represented by a parameter b that lies between zero and 1. The
stronger the union (b) the weaker the firm (1-b) and vice versa. The two parties are non-
cooperative in the sense that both the workers, represented by the union, and the owners,
represented by the firm, try to secure the biggest share of the pie. What the union tries to
maximize in the bargain is its utility over and above the utility that it would be left with in case
                                                          
6 The fall back income of workers is given by the following: WW B a =+ - aa .() . 1  with a Î [0,1]
where a is a measure for the mobility of labour between firms in a sector (exogenous to the model), W is
the wage paid by other firms in the sector and B is non-labour income which is set equal to zero..This
specification is based on Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) but with a somewhat simpler interpretation.
Their specification of the fall back income is Wu W u B a =- + () . . 1  where u is the unemployment rate.
Although we do not explicitly take unemployment on board in our analysis it can be shown that the
direction of the results is the same under both interpretations: national competition, in contrast to
international competition, increases the probability of finding a job and raises the fall back income.
7 Mobility of labour between firms in the sector is a function of rigidities in the labour market present in the
background but not explicitly modeled like for example hiring and firing costs.6
no agreement is reached. The latter is called the union’s threat point (U
°) because it represents
what the union would have when bargaining with the firm fails. What the firm tries to maximize
in the bargain is its profits over and above the profits it would have in case of conflict. The latter
is again referred to as the firm’s threat point (p°) because it is the payoff for the firm when no
agreement is reached between union and firm. When no agreement is reached in the bargaining
process we assume that no output can be produced. This renders firm’s profits and union utility
equal to zero in case of conflict. Hence the threat points U° and p° are equal to zero.
After the wage is determined in the bargaining process, we assume that firms decide on
employment levels depending on the competition in the product market (monopoly or Cournot
duopoly) without the interference of the union
8.
In what follows we first discuss the results under autarky (monopoly) and than consider
what happens with additional entry (duopoly). We analyze different levels of wage negotiations
(firm level, sectoral level) and different types of entrants (national versus international).
Autarky
Suppose under autarky there is one national incumbent firm in the market, fully
exploiting its market power in the product market. When there is only one domestic firm in the
sector in autarky the fall back income (Wa) of workers in the labour market, is zero. Irrespective
of the amount of friction in the labour market, the possibility for workers of finding a job in
another firm in the sector is nihil. Hence, the fall back income of workers in autarky is equal to
the non-labour income which is assumed to be zero (Wa=B=0).
In order to limit the mathematical notation in the text, the equilibrium wage and
employment level in the manufacturing sector under autarky are listed in the appendix. Here we
will refer to them as the initial state of the economy. We next analyze how this alters as we allow
increased national and international competition. At the end of this section in table 1 we offer a
numerical example which illustrates the difference between the scenarios. The initial state of the
economy is listed in the first column of table 1.
National Competition
When there is an extra entrant which locates in the national market, a national duopoly
arises. With two firms in the market the outside wage in the unionized sector is now the wage
paid by the other firm in the market. We start by analyzing wage negotiations at the firm level
and assume equal bargaining power in each firm. This results in two reaction functions whereby
the equilibrium wage for each firm becomes a function of the wage paid in the other firm.
Solving these two equations gives the equilibrium wages for both firms which are the same given
that firms are assumed identical. The mathematical expressions can be found in the appendix.
When the labour market is frictionless which is the equivalent of perfect inter-firm
mobility of labour (a=1), the equilibrium wages in both firms are higher than under autarky.
While in the other extreme case where inter-firm mobility is zero (a=0), the equilibrium wages
                                                          
8 We solve this game by backwards induction to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in employment
and wages. This implies that we first solve the product market competition stage to obtain equilibrium
quantities, where wages are assumed to be exogenous. We use the reduced profit function to solve the first
stage of the game, maximizing the Nash product, which yields us the subgame perfect equilibrium wage and
employment.7
are lower than under autarky. For a value of a=1/2, the equilibrium wage level is equal to the
wage under monopoly
9. This result suggests that an increase of national competition in the
product market, does not necessarily result in a downward pressure on wages when inter-firm
mobility is sufficiently high. Endogenous wage formation at the firm level together with high
mobility of labour between firms results in a sort of ‘race to the top’ whereby firms are willing to
pay higher wages whenever there are other national firms in the market which offer job
opportunities for workers. This result goes in the direction of Dewatripont (1988) where it was
shown in a dynamic framework with fixed costs of entry that the presence of unions at the firm
level work as an entry barrier.
Result 1:
A reduction in product market competition whereby the competitor locates in the national market
can lead to higher or lower national wages than under autarky depending on the degree of inter-
firm mobility of labour (a) in the sector. When inter-firm mobility is high/low (degree of friction
in the labour market) (a  > < ½), an increase in competition leads to an increase/decrease in
domestic wages.
Our model is a ‘right-to-manage’ model whereby after the wage has been set, the firms decide on
employment along their labour demand curve. With national competition, the extra firm locates
in the national market and creates employment opportunities. As inter-firm mobility gets higher,
firms’ profits are squized more because wages are pushed up as workers have a better outside
option in terms of a higher probability of finding a job in the sector. It is even possible for the
national wage to become so high
10 that an increase in domestic competition reduces domestic
employment. Or in other words that the duopoly output becomes smaller than the monopoly
output.
An example of how national competition changes the important variables in the industry is
offered in columns 2 to 4 in table 1 where we consider a numerical example with three different
levels of a (a=0.3; a=0.5; a=0.9). A low value of a means that the probability of a national
entrant does not affect the probability of finding a job much. Or, alternatively can be interpreted
as a high degree of friction in the labour market. If that is the case (f.e. a=0.3) than domestic
wages and the domestic price level drop while national employment is increased as a result of
entry (column 2). However, in the opposite case where national entry does significantly affect the
probability for workers to find a job (f.e. a=0.9), wages can be pushed up to a higher level than
under autarky while employment will be lower. Note that the domestic price has gone up despite
the extra entry in the market. Firm profits however are much lower than in the initial state of the
economy (column 4). This seems to suggest that improved market accessibility in the presence of
unions can lead to a transfer from consumers (they pay a higher price) and firms (profit margins
are squeezed) to workers (higher wages) although the number of workers that benefit is lower
than under autarky. In such a situation the wages of insiders go up but less workers are
employed. Note that in the example in table 1 wages change for unchanged values of the union
bargaining power (b). This example illustrates that in contrast to what is generally believed by
competition authorities, price does not necessarily drop with an increase in the number of
                                                          
9 For all values of  0 £ a £ 1, the equilibrium wage in both firms in the event of firm level wage negotiations
lies between W Î [a.b/(4-b), a]. The autarky wage is a.b/2 which is also what we get under firm level
bargaining for a=1/2.
10 The critical value for the wage is equal to W = [a - 3/8.a(2-b)].8
competitors in the product market. Neither can we infer from observing high prices in the market
that firms necessarily have high profit margins.
Result 2:
When inter-firm mobility of labour in the sector is low, national entry reduces price, lowers
wages and increases employment. However, when inter-firm mobility is high, an extra
competitor located in the market can lead to an increase in domestic wages, an increase in the
domestic price and a reduction in national employment.
What happens when the level of wage bargaining is more central like sector level bargaining? In
contrast to wage negotiations at the firm level, with sector level bargaining the union is now
concerned about industry employment and in the bargaining stage industry profits rather than
firm level profits are maximized. The alternative wage Wa under sector level bargaining now
becomes zero for the simple reason that when workers are not employed by the sector (firm 1 or
2) they are unemployed and earn nothing since non-labour income B is zero. The results which
are given in the appendix show that the equilibrium wage under sector level wage bargaining is
equal to the wage level under autarky and the wage obtained on the basis of firm level
negotiations for a=1/2. For a mobility degree higher than ½, firm level negotiations result in
higher wages than sector level negotiations while the opposite applies for a degree of mobility
below ½. This leads to the following result:
Result 3:
Under national competition the endogenous wage negotiated at the sector level is equal to the
autarky (monopoly) wage. Sectoral wages are higher than/lower than/equal to the wage under
firm level wages for a degree of labour mobility between firms (a) lower than/ higher than/
equal to 1/2.
In table 1, the results for sector level bargaining correspond with firm level bargaining for a value
of a=1/2. From column 3 we see that domestic wages are the same as under autarky, while
employment has gone up and price has gone down. The domestic incumbent faces reduced
profitability due to the lower price in the product market as a result of entry. Comparing columns
(3) with (2) and (4) we see that for low mobility of labour (a=0.3), firm level wages are indeed
lower than sector level wages while for high mobility of labour the reverse holds (a=0.9).
Let us now turn to the case where the extra competitor in the market locates abroad
which means it is not subject to wage bargaining.
International Competition
When the entrant in the market is a foreign firm exporting to the domestic market domestic
unions no longer have power over the wage paid by the foreign firm. We assume that the foreign
wage W2 is exogenously given
11. (Subscript 1 in now used to indicate variable of the home
country and subscript 2 for variables of the foreign country). nternational competition in the form
of imports imply that the fall back income of national workers does not change but remains zero
because the probability of finding another job is not affected. However, the level of W2 will
                                                          
11 A lower wage abroad can be due to many reasons. In a traditional trade framework, differences in wages
are explained by differences in factor endowments. A lower wage abroad would suggest that the foreign
country is relatively more endowed with labour.9
influence national wage negotiations since equilibrium output depends on W2 implying that
national employment and profits are also a function of W2. The equilibrium wage and
employment levels are given in the appendix. Note that the home wage (W1) is a positive
function of the foreign wage level (W2) which implies that the higher/lower the foreign wage, the
higher/lower the domestic wage. In the extreme case where W2 0 = , the domestic wage is lower
than any wage level under national Cournot competition. When Wa 2 =  , the foreign wage is so
high that sales on the domestic market are not viable which leads to a national monopoly with an
equilibrium wage equal to autarky level. For values of aW ³³ 2 0, for which domestic sales are
possible, international competition always results in domestic wages which are lower or equal




An increase in  international competition (imports in the relevant product market) always lowers
domestic wages.
Regarding employment the following applies. When the foreign wage is equal to zero (W2=0),
imports lower the market share of the incumbent and lower domestic employment. For a positive
wage level abroad (W2>0), we find that imports result in more or less domestic employment
depending on the strength of the domestic Union (b) and the level of the foreign wage (W2)
 12.
The mathematical expression showing this result can also be found in the appendix. The
interpretation is the following. The higher (lower) the foreign wage, the more likely that imports
will result in domestic job creation (destruction). Unions also matter. Under weak (strong) union
power, imports are more likely to result in domestic job losses (gains). The intuition behind this
result is that under weak unions, wages are relatively low and employment relatively high under
autarky in the absence of competition. Under strong unions the opposite applies which means
that a reduction in monopoly power through imports will more easily result in extra jobs.
Result 5:
Imports in the relevant product market have ambiguous effects on domestic employment; the
direction depends on the foreign wage level and domestic union power. The higher the wage
level abroad and the higher the domestic union power, the more likely that imports can increase
the demand for labour even beyond the autarky level.
Again we turn to table 1 to illustrate the results with a numerical example. The last two columns
show what happens under international competition where the extra entrant active in the relevant
product market of the national firm locates abroad. We fix the level of domestic bargaining
power (b) but we vary the foreign wage level (W2). In column (5) imports come from a low wage
country (W2=1) while in column (6) imports come from a high wage country (W2=4).
Irrespective of the wage level abroad, domestic wages and product market price always drop with
imports compared to autarky.











In terms of employment we note that when imports come from a low wage country (5)
domestic jobs are lost. When imports come from a high wage country (6) domestic jobs are
preserved or increased
13 compared to autarky.

















Wage 2.5 1.92 2.5 6.25 1.37 1.75
Empl. 3.75 5.38 5 2.5 2.75 3.5
Price 6.25 4.61 5 7.5 4.12 5.25
Profits 14.0 7.24 6.25 1.56 7.56 12.25
Notes: a) The demand parameters in this exercise are set equal to: a=10, b=1,
the bargaining power of the union is set equal to b=0.5
b) national versus international do no refer to ownership but to location
c) a= probability of finding a job in the sector
Policy Implications
In the previous section we discussed two channels through which monopoly power of a domestic
incumbent can be eroded: imports and national entry. The former resides under trade policy the
latter under competition policy. While trade policy is the responsibility of supra-national bodies
like the WTO and the European Commission, competition policies are still the responsibility of
national authorities. Under endogenous wage formation both types of polices have different
effects on domestic labour markets. Our results suggest that trade liberalization of imports will
always lower domestic wages and the product market price but can have ambiguous effects on
employment depending on the wage level of the trade partner. The profits of domestic firms go
down but wages go down relatively more. National entry with extra firms locating in the national
market can have very different effects. As long as entry does not significantly affect the job
opportunities for workers in the domestic market, competition has the expected effects of
lowering wages, prices and enhancing employment. Domestic profits decrease relatively more
than domestic wages. However, if under firm level wage bargaining the probability of finding a
job is significantly increased, wages will be pushed up which can result in domestic prices which
are higher than under autarky. Under those conditions it is very well possible that an increase in
                                                          
13 For a value of W2=5.5, employment in column (6) becomes higher than in (1) but for W2=6, the foreign
market share turns zero.11
the number of competitors in the market lowers profit margins and at the same time increases
price and wages to workers (wages are increased more).
Sector level bargaining after entry keeps wages in place while at the same time lowers the price
and lowers firms’ profit margins. This seems to suggest that more centralized bargaining is less
likely to affect wages, while prices and profits are reduced. The analysis therefore suggests that
trade liberalization and competition policy can have different effects on the labour market which
supports the view that they are complements rather than substitutes. Domestic incumbent firms
prefer imports to national entry because imports discipline wages more than profit margins.
Domestic workers however, are likely to prefer national entry which lowers firms’ profits
relatively more than wages.
III. The Empirical Evidence
In this section we look for empirical evidence which could confirm the above predictions. Most
studies to date have used sector level data on employment, wages and import penetration at a
fairly aggregate industrial classification (1 or 2 digit) to test the effects of increased globalization
on the labour market (e.g. Abraham and Brock, 1997; Revenga,1992). While sector studies can
reveal a number of interesting patterns, they could hide important differential responses of firms
within one sector. This is especially the case when strategic interactions between firms within the
same sector are important. For this reason we opted for firm level data published in yearly
accounts which we supplemented with a postal survey inquiring amongst others after the effect
of increased globalization.
The survey was carried out in the Summer of 1997. We sent out 2041 surveys with questions
relating to employment levels, wages of blue collars versus white collars, the extent of foreign
and domestic competition, etc.. This resulted in a sample of 234 firms, or a response rate of 12%.
The addresses were obtained by a random draw from the published company accounts of all large
Belgian firms. To be included in the data set at least two of the following criteria had to be
satisfied: Total number of workers greater than 150, total assets more than 12 million US dollars,
total turnover more than 12 million US dollars. Thus one drawback from the data set is that we
do not cover the very small firms. The data refer to plant data for the years 1994-1997 as we
explicitly asked to answer the survey with respect to the plant the questionnaire was sent to.
One potential problem with surveys is that there might be sample selection bias with respect to
the firms that decide to cooperate in the survey. Table 2 shows the initial distribution according
to the one digit Nace sector classification of the original sample and of the responses. A
statistical test of differences in proportions between the original sample and the responses shows
that there is no statistically significant difference between the two, hence we can say that there is
no sample selection bias in the responses.12
Table 2: Distribution of Belgian firms in the Postal Survey
SECTOR SELECTED FIRMS FIRMS WHICH ANSWERED Z-VALUE
Number Frequency Number Frequency
1 3 0,01 0 0,00 n.m.
2 285 0,14 38 0,16 0.37
3 320 0,16 34 0,15 0.17
4 788 0,39 84 0,36 0,48
5 222 0,1 41 0,18 1,19
6 69 0,03 7 0,03 0,05
7 311 0,15 26 0,11 0,56
8 38 0,019 3 0,01 0,06
9 5 0,001 1 0,00 n.m.
Total 2041 1 234 1
n.m.: not mentioned
Table 3 gives summary statistics on a number of variables that we used in our analysis. Two key
variables are of interest in the current context. The first is related to how we measure
international competition and the second to national competition. We defined an increase in
international competition (fc) as an increase in the number of firms that became active in the
relevant product market of the Belgian firm we sampled, which are not located in Belgium. An
increase in national competition (dc) was then defined similarly but referring to competitors
located within Belgium. The question asked in the survey was: Did your plant, for its most
important product, experience for the period ‘94-’97 an increase/decrease/no change in
national/international competition? (it was clarified what we meant with national and
international competition) In the theoretical section it became clear that this distinction has
implications for the effects on domestic employment and wages because domestic competitors
are subject to the same institutional settings but foreign competitors are not.
Virtually nobody responded with a decrease in competition. Therefore we restrict our attention to
increased competition versus no change. Table 3 shows that about 75% of the firms experienced
an increase in international competition between 1994 and ‘97. Of this 75%, 32 percentage
points refers to increased international competition that originates from Central and Eastern
Europe and/or Asia. Increased national competition was only experienced in 58% of the cases.
Our sampling is limited to the large firms with total number of workers higher than 150.
According to Belgian law firms with at least 50 employees are required to recognize trade
unions. Therefore all firms in our sample can be considered to be unionized. However, union
power can differ significantly between firms. Moreover is it not necessarily the case that the
most important level at which negotiations occur are at the firm. To obtain an idea about trade
union power in the plant we asked: At what level did negotiations with trade unions take place
and what are the negotiable issues ?
81 % of the firms answered that negotiations with trade unions occur at some level. Of those
firms where negotiations with trade unions take place, 58% occurs at the firm level while 54%
occurs at sector level
14.
                                                          
14 In some cases negotiations occur at both the sector and firm level.13
In 66% of the firms, it was reported that trade unions also have a substantial impact on either
wages, employment and/or work conditions in the firm. In those firms where unions matter,
negotiations are either on wages (69%), on employment (40%) or on work conditions (66%).
Only 34% of the firms responded that trade unions do not have much impact. We take this as our
indicator for union power. We use a dummy equal to 1 if  the union has some impact, 0 else,
(union).
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Increased foreign competition 75%
Increased domestic competition 58%
Unionized 81%
Unions have impact 66%
Negotiations over wages when unions matter 69%
mean number of blue collar workers 315
mean hourly wage 384
Finally, it can be seen in table 3 that the average plant (averaged over firms and over years 1994-
’97) employs 315 blue collar workers, paying them an average hourly gross wage of  384 BF
15.
Growth in the number of blue collar (white collars) workers is negative (positive) while growth
in their wages is positive.
In the majority of firms in the survey (52%), between 76 and 100% of the blue collar workers are
unionized. While for white collars the majority of firms report a very low degree of unionization:
61% of the firms have trade union membership of white collars  not higher than 25%. Given that
we are interested in the interaction of competition and unions we restrict our analysis to blue
collar workers as typically blue collar workers have lower education levels and are more
unionized.
In table 4 we show summary statistics for growth rates in blue collar workers and the hourly
wage for different splits of the sample. Regarding workers, the first two rows show that in
unionized plants the mean growth of workers is negative, while in non-unionized plants this is
positive. This result is consistent with the findings for the UK by Blanchflower et al. (1991) that
unionized plants have lower employment growth rates and it suggests that the right to manage
model where unions bargain over wages only, is the correct model to think about the way in
which unions operate. The second column in table 4 shows that the mean growth rate in wages is
higher in unionized plants than in non-unionized ones. The third and the fourth row show that
plants which experienced an increase in international competition (fc) have a lower growth rate
for both workers and wages than plants that did not experience an increase in foreign
competition. In the theoretical section we showed that national employment effects of
international competition depend on the foreign wage level. Since the data suggest that the
majority of foreign competition is from low wage countries (CEE, Asia), it is no surprise to find
a lower wage growth rate in firms that experienced an increase in foreign competition. In the
final two rows the same exercise is done for an increase in domestic competition (dc). An
increase in domestic competition is on average associated with lower employment growth, but
higher wage growth. In the theoretical section it became clear that with an increase in domestic
competition, domestic wages increase as a result of competition for workers in terms of wages
(provided there is inter-firm mobility). The summary statistics are consistent with this prediction
                                                          
15 At an exchange rate of 1$=35BF, this is about $11.14
showing that an increase in domestic competition results in a higher wage increase than in the
absence of domestic competition.
Table 4:  Summary statistics on growth
Growth of Workers Growth of Wages
Unionized -0.01 0.04
non-unionized 0.04 0.02
Increased fc 0.01 0.02
no increase in fc 0.02 0.05
Increased dc 0.01 0.04
no increase in dc 0.02 0.02
We now turn to a more rigorous testing of our theoretical predictions. We set out to estimate
reduced form equations of employment and wage equations. We estimate both the employment
equation and the wage equation in first differenced form for two reasons. First, this allows us to
control for unobserved fixed effects and second our indicators of foreign and domestic
competition are measuring changing competition. Therefore it is important to estimate a change
in employment/wages on a change in competition. Since our competition variables refer to the
changing competition between 1994-97 we estimate the equations between 1994-97 and control
for unobserved aggregate shocks by including year dummies
16 for the change between 1995-96
(yd96) and from 1996-97 (yd97). We start in table 5 by reporting the results for the employment
equations. In column (1) we show the direct effects of increased foreign (fc94) and domestic
competition (dc94) and the interaction of increased foreign competition with unionization (fc_un)
on the plant level growth in blue collar workers. Increased foreign competition has a statistical
negative effect, while increased domestic competition is negatively but insignificantly correlated
with the change in the number of blue collars at plant level. The direct effect of unions (union) is
negative, which is consistent with the right to manage model. The interaction term is positive
suggesting that the negative effect of foreign competition is offset by the effect of trade unions.
The interaction term on foreign competition and union power confirms our theoretical finding
that the effect of international competition is a function of  the level of the union bargaining
power in the sector. We showed that the higher the domestic union bargaining power, the more
likely the positive effect of foreign competition on employment.
In column (2) we include other control variables such as indicators of the degree of competition
firms face in their product market. Specifically, tough1 and tough2 refer to the price
responsiveness of firms. In the questionnaire the following question was asked: What is your
expectation of the price movement if some other firms enter ? (plummet ?, go down strongly ?, go
down ?, not change ?, go up ?)
In constructing the dummy tough1 we considered all firms that responded, price would plummet
or go down strongly while tough 2 represents those firms that face weaker competition with a
value of 1 whenever firms reported price would go down.
                                                          
16 The change from 1994-95 is the benchmark.15
Table 5: Employment Equation: the change in the number of blue collar workers at plant
level.































































Note: t-statistics between brackets, * or ** significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively
fc94: plants which had an increase in international competition  over the period ‘94 -’97
dc94: plants which had an increase in national competition over the period ‘94 -’97
Union: dummy with value 1 if unions have an impact
fc-un: dummy with value of 1 if plants had an increase in international competition and unions have an
impact
tough1: dummy with value 1 if price competition in sector is tough
tough2: dummy with value 1 if price competition in sector is weak
Comp: dummy with value 1 if firm faces many rivals
yd96, yd97: year dummies to control for unobserved aggregate shocks
The variable comp was constructed on the basis of the number of competitors a firm is said to be
facing in its most important product market; comp gets a value of 1 if the firm is facing many
competitors (suggests tough competition) while a value of 0 otherwise. These variables control
for the degree of competition in the product market. The results suggest that the change in the
number of blue collar workers at plant level does not differ much with the degree of competition
in the product market
17. Indeed our theoretical results indicated that variables such as the inter-
firm mobility of labour, the wage level abroad and unionization matter more in explaining the
direction of domestic employment change.
                                                          
17 We also checked the theoretical results for Stackelberg competition with the incumbent being the leader
but the results go in the same direction as under Cournot which suggest the degree of competition in the
product market is not the most important determinant (Stackelberg leads to lower prices than Cournot).16
As a proxy for the degree of inter-firm mobility measured by parameter a in the theory we use an














POSjt is the job creation rate or the sum of all job gains in expanding firms in sector j at time t
divided by the employment of the sector. NEGjt is the job destruction rate or the sum of all job
losses at time t expressed as a positive number divided by employment in the sector j. GROSSjt is
the sum of job creation and destruction (POS + NEG) or the job reallocation rate which is an
indicator of the turbulence in a sector j. If this index equals 1 than all job reallocation occurs
entirely within one sector between different firms, when the index is equal to 0 than all job
reallocation occurs across sectors.
We computed IIJ at the level of one digit sectors using all firms that reported positive
employment and were required to submit company accounts with the Central Bank of Belgium
for the year 1994. The mean value of the IIJ index for our sample is 0.6. The results of a split
regression for values of the IIJ index above 0.6 (inter-firm mobility is high) and below 0.6 (inter-
firm mobility is low) are shown in table 5 in columns (3) and (4).
For a high degree of inter-firm mobility (IIJ > 0.6 column (3)), the effect of domestic competition
on blue collar employment change is more negative and has a higher t-value than when inter-firm
mobility is low (IIJ < 0.6 column (4)). This is in line with the theoretical result that the higher a,
the more likely that an increase in domestic competition has a negative effect on domestic jobs.
In table 6 we turn to the results of the wage equation.
Table 6: Wage Equations: the wage growth of blue collars at plant level























































Note: t-statistics between brackets, * or ** significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.17
Columns 1 and 2 show that an increase in foreign competition has a robust negative effect on
blue collar wage growth while an increase in domestic competition has a positive effect on wages
but only at the 90% confidence interval. Both findings are in line with the theory.
The extent to which unions matter represented by the union dummy  is not significant. But the
degree of inter-firm mobility seems to matter. Column (3) and (4) give the results of a split
regression for industries with a value of IIJ above and below 0.6 respectively. When the IIJ is
high (IIJ > 0.6 column (3)), suggesting a high degree of inter-sector mobility, the effect of
domestic competition on wages is positive and more significant then when IIJ is low (column
(4)), as predicted by the theory.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the geographical location of competitors matters in the presence
of domestic unions and endogenous wage formation. An additional firm locating in the domestic
country is regarded as national competition irrespective of the ownership of the firm. Whereas if
the competitor locates abroad and provides the relevant product market through exports that is
considered to be international competition. While both in the case of an increase in national and
international competition, the domestic sector faces a reduction in price cost margins, the effects
on domestic wages, price and industry employment differs.
In the first part of the paper we construct a simple partial equilibrium and static framework where
we vary the degree of price competition in the product market. Although we are fully aware of
the numerous limitations inherent to the approach we used, we believe that the point we want to
make is a valid one. We show that when institutional settings are country specific, the effects of
imports can be very different from those of an increase in competition from domestically based
firms.
Under the conditions outlined in this paper we argued that imports results in a reduction of
domestic wages irrespective of the wage level of the trade partner abroad. While importing from
a low wage country leads to a reduction in the number of domestic jobs,  imports from a high
wage country can actually lead to job gains compared to autarky. The intuition for the last result
is that import competition lowers the domestic price which increases demand. If the import
competitor has high costs, a relatively larger market share goes to the domestic firm which can
increase employment levels beyond autarky. It was also shown that for a fixed wage level abroad,
the strength of the union also determines whether import competition will create or destroy
domestic jobs. The higher the bargaining power of the union, the more likely import competition
will result in job gains.
An increase in domestic competition, for example through improved market accessibility, can
have different effects on the labour market depending on the level at which trade unions operate
(firm or sectoral) and the extent to which workers can move between firms in the sector. Sector
level negotiations imply that wages are the same as under autarky. Firm level negotiations can
lead to lower or higher wages compared to autarky depending on the degree of inter-firm
mobility of labour. When labour mobility is very high, wages can be pushed up beyond autarky
levels. When this situation prevails in the labour market, national competition can lead to a
higher price and a loss of jobs compared to autarky.
In the second part of the paper we used Belgian company data supplemented with data from a
postal survey which we carried out in 1997 in 2041 Belgian firms with a response rate of 12%.18
The survey data revealed that the majority of the respondents experienced an increase both in
domestic and in foreign competition in the period 1994-97.
Several reduced employment and wage equations were tested for the Belgian firms. We restricted
the regressions to blue collar workers given that the degree of unionization turned out highest in
that group. Foreign competition for Belgian firms was felt most strongly from low wage
countries (CEE, Asia), the negative effect of foreign competition in the employment equation and
in the wage equation was expected on the basis of the theory.
Union bargaining power turned out to be inversely correlated with the change in blue collar
workers’ employment which suggests that the ‘right to manage model’ was the correct one to use
in the theoretical model. Hence high bargaining power yields high wages and low employment
which explains the negative effect of union bargaining in the employment equation. However an
interaction of an increase in foreign competition with union bargaining power had a significantly
positive effect on employment which suggests that in the event of strong domestic unions,
foreign competition results in job gains which was consistent with the theoretical prediction.
An increase in domestic competition was negative but not significant in the employment
equation. After performing split regressions on the basis intra-industry job mobility which we
took as a proxy for worker mobility between firms in the sector, we noted that the effect of
domestic competition on employment was more negative when inter-firm mobility was high
which is what we expected on the basis of the theory.
In the wage equation, an increase in domestic competition had a positive and significant effect on
wages. The split regressions showed that this effect was strongest when inter-firm mobility
proxied by intra-sector job mobility was highest. Again this is a confirmation of the theoretical
prediction of domestic competition on wages.
In the light of the special issue on Trade and Competition in this volume we can say that in
contrast to what is often heard, our theoretical and empirical results seem to suggest that trade
liberalization and competition policy (which usually deals with issues of market accessibility),
should not be regarded as substitutes. The reason is that national competition (responsibility of
competition authorities) can have very different effects on sectoral prices, wages and
employment than international competition (responsibility of trade authorities). If governments
are mainly concerned about consumer welfare and profitability of national firms, the free flow of
imports seems the best way to ensure those objectives. The reason is that imports will always
lower domestic prices and will reduce wages even more. However, if governments primary
objective is to secure high wage and employment levels our analysis suggest they should
encourage national entry (for example FDI) by improving market accessibility and by reducing
the friction (like hiring and firing costs) in the labour market to smooth the mobility of workers
between jobs.19
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APPENDIX
The demand in the home market is assumed linear and of the following form.
PQ a b Q () =- (A.1)
where Q reflects the monopolist’s output. When we move from a domestic monopoly to a Cournot duopoly
we use X to refer to the output of the incumbent and Y for the output of the entrant.
The Union utility function is given by:
UWL W W L a (,) ( ) . =-
e (A.2)
where W is the domestic wage which will be bargained over, Wa represents the ‘fall back income’ or what
workers get if they are not employed by the firm/sector, L refers to the employment level, set by the firm in
a later stage of the game ande  is a parameter of wage preference. In order to simplify the calculations we
will set e equal to 1 where the union gives equal weight to wages and jobs. An alternative interpretation of e
=1 is that the union is risk-neutral and maximizes the total wage bill.
The fall back income of workers (Wa) is a function of:
WW B a =+ - aa .() . 1  with a Î [0,1] (A.3)
where a is a measure for the mobility of labour between firms in a sector (exogenous to the model), W is
the wage paid by other firms in the sector and B is non-labour income which is set equal to zero
18. Another
way of interpreting a is the amount of friction in the labour market. A value of a=1 means the domestic
labour market is frictionless and there is perfect mobility of labour between firms. While for a=0, labour
market rigidities are so high that  despite the presence of other firms in the market, labour is immobile
between firms
In the first stage of the model, wage negotiations take place along a non-cooperative Nash bargaining
process:
                                                          
18 This specification is based on Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) but with a somewhat simpler
interpretation. Their specification of the fall back income is Wa= (1-u).W + u.B where u is the
unemployment rate. Although we do not explicitly take unemployment on board in our analysis it can be
shown that the direction of the results is the same under both interpretations: national competition, in
contrast to international competition, increases the probability of finding a job and raises the fall back
income.22
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The Nash product (W) consists of the utility of the union U (w, L) above the threat point U° times the profit
of the domestic firm p (w, L) above the threat point p°. These threat points are the payoffs when no
agreement is reached between union and firm. In case of conflict, no output can be produced which renders
firm’s profits and union utility equal to zero. Hence the threat points U° and p° are set equal to zero. The
parameter b lies between zero and 1 and is an indicator of union power in the bargaining process.
After the wage is determined in the bargaining process, we assume that firms decide on employment levels
(‘right-to-manage’ model) depending on the competition in the product market (monopoly or Cournot
duopoly).
We solve the game by backwards induction to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in employment
and wages. This implies that we first solve the product market competition stage (monopoly, national and
international duopoly) to obtain equilibrium quantities, where wages are assumed to be exogenous. We use
the reduced profit function to solve the first stage of the game, maximizing the Nash product, which yields
us the subgame perfect equilibrium wage and employment.
AUTARKY: initial state of the economy (monopoly in the product market)
Using the production function Q=L whereby Q is the monopoly output, the Union’s utility in the domestic
country is given by:
UWL W W L W
aW
b





   with  Wa = 0 (A.5)







The Nash bargaining Product is then given by:























































Using the production function X=L and Y=L, whereby X and Y represent duopoly output of incumbent and












with i, j  =  1,2   and  i¹ j (A.10)









with i, j  =  1,2   and  i¹ j (A.11)
The first order condition of the Nash bargaining product results in a reaction curve for each of the two
national firms where wage at the firm level is a function of the wage in the other firm:
¶
¶










    with i, j  =  1,2   and  i¹ j (A.12)
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For particular values of the parameter a which measures the ‘probability of finding another job’ in the
sector we get:
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Sector level bargaining
The results for firm level bargaining with a=1/2 are also the ones that apply under sector level bargaining.
INTERNATIONAL COURNOT COMPETITION
Domestic Union utility is given by:
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The equilibrium domestic wage that follows from the f.o.c. of the Nash bargaining product is equal to:
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For particular values of the exogenous wage abroad W2 we get:
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and  L2 0 * = (A.22)
It can be noted that national employment is higher/lower under Cournot (X) than under monopoly (Q) when
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